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Abstract: Cryptoeconomics describes an interdisciplinary, emergent and experimental field that 
draws on ideas and concepts from economics, game theory and related disciplines in the design of 
peer-to-peer cryptographic systems. Cryptoeconomic systems try to guarantee certain kinds of 
information security properties using incentives and/or penalties to regulate the distribution of 
efforts, goods and services in new digital economies. Cryptoeconomics is an embryonic field at 
present and can be taken to include several areas of focus: information security engineering, 
mechanism design, token engineering and market design. This portmanteau of cryptography and 




This article belongs to the Glossary of decentralised technosocial systems, a special 
section of Internet Policy Review. 
Definition 
Cryptoeconomics describes an interdisciplinary, emergent and experimental field 
that draws on ideas and concepts from economics, game theory and related disci-
plines in the design of peer-to-peer cryptographic systems. Cryptoeconomic sys-
tems try to guarantee certain kinds of information security properties using incen-
tives and/or penalties to regulate the distribution of efforts, goods and services in 
new digital economies. 
Cryptoeconomics is an embryonic field at present and can be taken to include sev-
eral areas of focus: information security engineering, mechanism design, token en-
gineering and market design. This portmanteau of cryptography and economics 
raises questions regarding the epistemic novelty of cryptoeconomics, as distinct 
from its constituent components. 
Origin 
The term cryptoeconomics entered casual usage in the formative years of the 
Ethereum developer community in 2014-5. The phrase is typically attributed to Vi-
talik Buterin with the earliest public usage being in a 2015 talk by Vlad Zamfir en-
titled “What is Cryptoeconomics” (Zamfir, 2015). For Buterin, the aim of cryptoeco-
nomics is “as a methodology for building systems that try to guarantee certain 
kinds of information security properties" (Buterin, 2017, pp. 46-56). While for Zam-
fir, the focus is more broadly on the distribution of efforts, goods and services in 
new digital economies: "A formal discipline that studies protocols that govern the 
production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services in a decentralized 
digital economy. Cryptoeconomics is a practical science that focuses on the design 
and characterization of these protocols" (Zamfir, 2015, 00:00:58). The term is un-
common amongst Bitcoin developers, but is occasionally used to discuss adversari-
al scenarios such as state-sponsored defensive mining and transaction censorship 
(Voskuill, 2018). 
Cryptoeconomics was coined by the Ethereum community but was initially inspired 
by the use of economic incentives in the Bitcoin protocol (Nakamoto, 2008). Bit-
coin mining is designed with the intention that it would be more profitable and at-
tractive to contribute to the network than to attack it. With the development of 
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Ethereum as the first successful general-purpose blockchain protocol, the idea of 
using economic incentives was also generalised as an approach to achieve a broad 
variety of behavioural and information security outcomes for decentralised sys-
tems. This has led to experimentation with the use of cryptographic techniques 
and incentives in organisational, financial, market and monetary experiments 
(Davidson et al., 2016; Halaburda et al., 2018; Voshmgir, 2019). 
Motivation for the development of cryptoeconomics arises from the need to solve 
specific information security, organisational and economic problems that manifest 
in cryptographic systems. Examples include incentive alignment between stake-
holder participants in permissionless networks and developing viable alternative 
approaches to distributed consensus other than proof-of-work, which is also com-
monly referred to as blockchain mining. In this sense, the portmanteau cryptoeco-
nomics (or crypto-economics) as a combination of cryptography and economics 
raises an interesting question regarding epistemic reducibility. Can cryptoeconom-
ics be fully deconvoluted—in other words, retro-synthesised—into its constituent 
namesakes; is it a mere combination or greater than the sum of its parts? A partic-
ular respondent’s answer might fall along the lines of their proclivity towards gen-
eral-purpose blockchain networks and / or proof-of-work. 
The aforementioned affinity to decentralisation as an axiomatic aim and primary 
concept originates from a longer history of the development of peer-to-peer sys-
tems as a means to establish autonomous networks (Brekke, 2020). With the in-
vention of Bitcoin, economic ideas were added to the toolbox of computer engi-
neers developing leaderless systems. For some, the motivation was to enable eco-
nomic autonomy and fair distribution of efforts and rewards within such decen-
tralised networks, what scholar of money and the internet Swartz calls infrastruc-
tural mutualism. For others, the promise of provably scarce and unforgeable virtual 
commodities—digital metallism—was the main attraction (Swartz, 2018). Adherents 
to the digital metallist ideology often draw upon economic and monetary concepts 
typically associated with libertarianism and the US far right (Golumbia, 2016). 
Evolution 
Over time there has been a broadening in the scope of what can be considered 
cryptoeconomics as the variety of consensus systems and token types has prolifer-
ated. The different approaches to cryptoeconomics are beginning to settle into dis-
tinct layers of a cryptoeconomic 'stack': 'layer 1' referring to the information securi-
ty of a network protocol such as proof-of-work and proof-of-stake; and 'layer 2' re-
ferring to the token, market or mechanism capacities offered by emerging cryptoe-
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conomic platforms (Alsindi, 2019). 
In recent years a number of networks affording general-purpose computation with 
facile smart contracting and token creation capabilities have emerged. This layer 2 
cryptoeconomics entails the creation of notionally valuable economic assets with-
out being connected to the underlying security properties of the network sub-
strate; for example ERC20-type Ethereum tokens, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) and 
more recently Decentralised Finance (DeFi) synthetic tokens. Whilst having notional 
economic value, these assets provide negligible security benefits to the base layer 
of the network: the abstracted non-native assets of 'layer 2' may increase the in-
centive to attack 'layer 1', as has been discussed in relation to ledger forks (Alsindi, 
2019), Initial Coin Offering launches and sudden market-moving events are seen 
regularly in the hyper financialised DeFi sector (Daian et al., 2019). 
The scope and definition of cryptoeconomics is still undergoing epistemic formation 
(0x Salon & Alsindi, 2020) and thus entails specific areas of focus: 
Information security engineering: Where the primary focus of the cryptoeconomic 
endeavour is on the security properties for peer-to-peer 'layer 1' protocols. 
Mechanism design: Where the focus is specifically on the use of incentives for be-
havioural engineering of rational agents in a game theoretical setting (Brown-Co-
hen et al., 2018). 
Token engineering: Where the primary focus is on the functionality and properties 
exhibited by tokens used in a system. Tokens might for example grant token hold-
ers specific rights (such as service access or voting privileges as commonly en-
countered with the ERC-20 pseudo-standard), be fungible or non-fungible such as 
NFTs, be generated and distributed through mining, or through airdrops. Different 
token designs are understood to encourage different types of behaviours and or-
ganisational properties (Voshmgir, 2019). 
Market design: Where the focus is on employing blockchain protocols and tokens in 
order to experiment with new kinds of markets that generate specific types of out-
comes. For example, bonding curves determine the price of tokens depending on 
the supply or other factors, with an aim to influence the behaviour of investors 
(Titcomb, 2019). 
Issues currently associated with the term 
Cryptoeconomics is generally understood to combine cryptographic techniques 
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and economics. However, much of the field of cryptoeconomics “shows an interest-
ing but also alarming characteristic: its underlying economics is remarkably conven-
tional and conservative” (Virtanen et al., 2018). Out of the long-standing and broad 
fields of economics and associated fields of political economy, monetary theory, fi-
nance and social study of finance, most literature on cryptoeconomics takes an 
overly formalist approach to the contested field of game theory (Green & Viljoen, 
2020). Virtanen et al. (2018, n.p.) quote a revealing tweet from the influential Nick 
Szabo: “An economist or programmer who hasn’t studied much computer science, in-
cluding cryptography, but guesses about it, cannot design or build a long-term success-
ful cryptocurrency. A computer scientist and programmer who hasn’t studied much eco-
nomics, but applies common sense, can.” This means that the potential of cryptoeco-
nomic approaches may be more reformist than revolutionary; “in spite of their noble 
intentions, these projects do not in fact break with the current financial paradigm”
(Lotti, 2016, p. 105). 
More recent characterisations of cryptoeconomics take a broader societal outlook, 
for example focusing on the economics of new organisational forms (Davidson et 
al., 2016), the design of economic space (Virtanen et al., 2018), or on economic and 
monetary design that draws on mutual credit systems (Brock et al., 2018) and com-
mons approaches (De Filippi & Hassan, 2015; Catlow, 2019). There is, in other 
words, much broader economic experimentation taking place with and through 
peer-to-peer cryptographic systems, however, those explicitly labelled cryptoeco-
nomic often imply narrow and formalist approaches limited to Austrian school eco-
nomics, right wing monetary ideas and game theory, especially apparent in the us-
age of the term in reference to Bitcoin (Golumbia, 2016; Voskuill, 2018). 
One of the ongoing challenges encountered in cryptoeconomics is inherent to 
mechanism design and market design economics more generally (Ossandón, 2019). 
Namely the contradiction between the promise of deterministic outcomes in theo-
ry and the complex, emergent behaviours and effects of the systems in real de-
ployments. On the one hand, the market design approach in cryptoeconomics 
promises to deliver specific properties (information security or behavioural out-
comes). But on the other hand, the simple rules of the systems designs produce 
complexity and unintended outcomes (Voshmgir & Zargham, 2019). A contradic-
tion off-handedly commented on by Ethereum developer Floersch when discussing 
the Casper proof-of-stake approach: "[W]e have this complex behavior emerging from 
really simple economic rules, and this actually not specific to Casper by any means, this 
is any protocol that are messing around with economics" (Floersch, 2017, pp. 12-18). 
This contradiction—of emergent complexity and unintended effects—is neverthe-
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less “productive” for those seeking to promote economic approaches to social 
problems: the promise of deterministic outcomes makes the models convincing 
and attractive from a formalist perspective (Green & Viljoen, 2020), while the com-
plexity obscures any “failures” of the design (Nik-Khah & Mirowski, 2019). These 
shortcomings are instead relegated to being a problem “of the social” or “with hu-
mans” or that the implementation was not sufficiently faithful to the protocol, or 
even that the protocol implementation was not being expansive or radical enough. 
This contradiction is extensively covered in political economic and economic histo-
ry and comprises one of the main critiques of the Austrian school of economics in 
particular (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2018; Heilbroner, 1998), what is also called the 
performative aspects of economics. From an information security perspective, the 
incorporation of economic incentives into protocol design in this sense radically 
increases the complexity of peer-to-peer systems, and correspondingly also leads 
to an increased attack surface and wider variety of hypothetical vulnerabilities 
(Alsindi, 2019). 
Conclusion 
In summary, cryptoeconomics refers to an emerging field that employs economic 
concepts in the design of peer-to-peer cryptographic systems. The origins of the 
field lie in specific information security problems arising out of such systems. Com-
peting approaches draw from a much wider field of economic and political eco-
nomic thinking, including mutual credit systems and commons frameworks, in or-
der to address questions of organisation and societal outcomes more broadly. 
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